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Red tapeIntermediaries that assist individuals and ﬁrms with the government bureaucracy are common in developing
countries. Although such bureaucracy intermediaries are, anecdotally, linkedwith corruption andwelfare losses,
few formal analyses exist.
We introduce amodel inwhich a government license can beneﬁt individuals.We study the net license gainwhen
individuals get the license through the regular licensing procedure, through bribing or through intermediaries.
For a given procedure, individuals using intermediaries are better off than if intermediaries and corruption had
not existed. Then, we study the incentives of corrupt bureaucrats to create red tape. Bureaucrats implement
more red tape and individuals are unambiguously worse off in a setting with intermediaries than with direct
corruption only.
Intermediaries can thus improve access to the bureaucracy, but also strengthen the incentives to create red tape –
a potential explanation why licensing procedures tend to be long in developing countries.
© 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Intermediaries that assist individuals and ﬁrms with the govern-
ment bureaucracy are present throughout the developing world. Yet,
there is a limited understanding of what such bureaucracy intermedi-
aries do. Although the prevalence of intermediaries is, anecdotally,
linkedwith corruption andwelfare losses, there are few formal analyses
and an almost complete lack of empirical studies.E Working Paper 2010:10 and
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. This is an open access article underThis paper aims at ﬁlling a gap in the theoretical literature on
bureaucracy intermediaries. In amodelwhere individuals can get a ben-
eﬁt by going through a licensing procedure at the government bureau-
cracy, we study how the net gain from the license is affectedwhen it can
also be obtained through intermediaries. We study how the incentives
of bureaucrats to create red tape are affected when there are intermedi-
aries, and the effect of such “endogenous red tape” on the license gain.
We also endogenize the existence of the intermediary sector itself.
The study focuses on one speciﬁc aspect of what intermediaries can
offer individuals and ﬁrms— time saving. Individuals can get the license
through the regular procedure, or by bribing corrupt bureaucrats to get
a speedier treatment, or from an intermediary, which allows for even
more time saving. From individuals' choice of how to get the license,
we derive several interesting and novel results. We ﬁrst show that,
ceteris paribus, individuals that get the license through either corrupt
bureaucrats or intermediaries are better off than if corruption and inter-
mediaries had not existed. Second, and importantly, we show that the
incentives to complicate licensing procedures and add red tape differ
in a model with intermediaries. Bureaucrats ﬁnd it optimal to create
more red tape when there are intermediaries. Third, when corrupt
bureaucrats can choose their “optimal” level of complication of the gov-
ernment bureaucracy, individuals' net gain is unambiguously lower in a
model with intermediaries than with “direct” corruption only.
An additional contribution is that we endogenize the existence of
the intermediary sector. Whether the sector arises or not, the degree
of competition within the sector, the effect on the license gain, andthe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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endogenous entry and oligopolistic competition between intermedi-
aries. We show that as long as entry costs are not too high and bureau-
crats are free to choose the level of red tape, the intermediary sector
exists, licensing procedures are longer and individuals are unambigu-
ously worse off, than without intermediaries.
For citizens to get a license from the government bureaucracy, a
number of steps must typically be completed, involving visits to several
ofﬁces, standing in lines, making different payments, etc. As long as the
costs for getting the license are smaller than the beneﬁt obtained, indi-
viduals will optimally choose to get it. The lower the costs, the better
off individuals will be. Importantly, any reduction in the license costs
will make available a surplus that would otherwise be lost, for instance
in queuing, waiting, going between different ofﬁces, etc., as well as on
the extensive margin where some individuals possibly switch from
“informality” into getting the license.2
Consider bureaucrats that are interested in capturing the surplus
associated with reducing license costs. Apart from legitimate license
fees, individuals face other costs, such as monetary costs for trans-
port, and time costs of queuing, waiting and going to the ofﬁces. It
is bureaucrats' removal of such time costs, against payments from
individuals, that is the focus in this paper. The model is inspired by
the fact, especially true in developing countries, that individuals and
ﬁrms typically spend considerable amounts of time in completing
licensing procedures, including visiting multiple government ofﬁces
at different locations and points in time.3 We refer to the reduction
of such time costs as “speed money corruption” for which individuals
pay “bribes” to bureaucrats. We take the principal–agent relation be-
tween bureaucrats and the government as given, assume that bureau-
crats can pocket the bribes, and focus on the optimal choice of such
bribes.
The time costs can be broadly categorized as either of the following
types: those that bureaucrats directly control and can affect, such as
waiting times in lines and processing times of applications within the
ofﬁce, and those that bureaucrats cannot directly control, such as the
time that individuals spend in transporting themselves between differ-
ent ofﬁces of the bureaucracy.
Paying a bribe to speed up the handling of the licensing procedure
is a typical example of the ﬁrst category. In a Brazilian survey of
entrepreneurs' costs and experiences to register a ﬁrm in the garment
industry, 40% of ﬁrms afﬁrm that “speeding up” the registration is pos-
sible (Zylbersztajn et al., 2007). In a related paper, Zylbersztajn and
Graça (2003, p. 14) ﬁnd evidence of “exposure to bribes solicited to
accelerate the process”. Gancheva (1999) discusses similar practices at
ﬁrm start-up in Bulgaria. Queuing times inside the ofﬁce is another
time cost that bureaucrats can affect, by accepting bribes to let individ-
uals jump queues. Even when paying for such “services”, the license
applicant typically has to complete the same steps as a regular appli-
cant. What the intermediary function does, however, is to also re-
duce costs that bureaucrats cannot directly control, further shorten
the time individuals spend in licensing and eliminate steps that the
individual has to undertake. This may include handing in/picking2 In Section 2, we document evidence on the prevalence of bureaucracy intermediaries.
Both individuals and ﬁrms use such intermediaries. The model is one of individuals'
demand for intermediaries, a demand derived from time saving aspects. However, it can
be broadly interpreted to also concern ﬁrms.
3 de Soto (1989) reported that starting a ﬁrm in Peru involved 11 steps at seven different
government authorities, and obtaining authorization to build a house on state-owned land
involved 15 steps at six authorities, which in turn consisted of 207 sub-steps at approxi-
mately 50 (sub-) ofﬁces/counters/desks. Property formalization, or similar procedures, in-
volved 168 steps in the Philippines, 77 in Egypt and 111 in Haiti (de Soto, 2000).
Following this work, the World Bank Doing Business project has documented procedures
for starting ﬁrms, registering property etc., in most countries. For the same procedure, the
number of ofﬁces to be visited,monetary costs, aswell as time spent, tend to be signiﬁcantly
higher in the developing world, as compared to developed countries (Djankov et al., 2002;
World Bank, 2012b).up the application at the different bureaucracy ofﬁces, undertaking
payments, assisting when the applicant ﬁlls in forms, taking care of
paperwork, and delivering the completed license to the applicant.
The applicant saves on transportation costs, both the monetary cost
and the time involved, and economizes on time spent to ﬁnd out
how the procedure works.
An individual can thus bribe corrupt bureaucrats to avoid some time
costs, or use an intermediary (that in turn pays bureaucrats), avoiding a
larger fraction of time costs.
In Section 3, we introduce a model with three players: individuals,
bureaucrats and intermediaries. Individuals can obtain a government
license in three ways: through the regular procedure, by “direct”
bribing, which eliminates some time costs, or through intermediaries,
which eliminates all time costs. Intermediaries, which in turn pay
“indirect” bribes to bureaucrats, maximize proﬁts from license fees,
and bureaucrats maximize proﬁts from direct and indirect bribes.
Weﬁrst study the effect of bribing and intermediaries on individuals'
gain for an exogenously speciﬁed licensing procedure. As intermediary
entry is endogenous, the paper provides new insights into when such
services can be expected to exist.
Many authors, e.g. Myrdal (1968), Rosenn (1971), de Soto (1989),
Tanzi (1998) and La Porta et al. (1999), have hypothesized that bureau-
crats deliberately create extra bureaucratic hurdles, or red tape, to
extract bribes and, in addition, some have argued that such proceeds
are channeled through intermediaries (Bertrand et al., 2007). As ex-
pressed by Rosenn, citing a typical Brazilian complaint regarding civil
servants and red tape; “êles criam diﬁculdades para vender facilidades
(they create difﬁculties in order to sell facilities)” (Rosenn (1971, p.
535, translation from the original)). In actual licensing procedures, we
often observe that a multitude of ofﬁces have to be visited, documents
should be stamped and certiﬁed, individuals have to visit the same bu-
reaucrat several times and deliver and pick up papers on different days
with varying opening hours, etc.
Inspired by such evidence, we then let bureaucrats choose not only
the level of the bribe but also the length/complexity of the licensing
procedure. We thus have in mind corrupt bureaucrats that either have
discretion over the actual implementation of the licensing procedure,
or that lobby against legislators with such inﬂuence, or that channel
corruption proceeds to supervisors in order to inﬂuence the complexity
of the procedure. In doing this analysis, we assume “centralized
corruption” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). All corrupt bureaucrats take
one joint decision on bribe levels (and the procedure length). In our
central result concerning red tape (Proposition 5, a special case of
which is Corollary 2), we show that there is more red tape and that
individuals are unambiguously worse off when the intermediary sector
exists than when there is “direct corruption” only.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.1 discusses related litera-
ture and Section 2 presents stylized facts about bureaucracy intermedi-
aries. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 discusses the results. The
proofs are in the appendix.
1.1. Relation to the literature on corruption and intermediaries
In this paper, corruption means “speed money”. The modeling
choice is different from many papers in the corruption literature,
where a typical question is how the existence of corruption affects the
allocation of (scarce) government beneﬁts/licenses/permits. The social
beneﬁt of allocating the permit to some (deserving) individuals is
higher than allocating it to other (undeserving) individuals. Banerjee
et al. (2012) model corruption and the emergence of red tape in such
settings. Bertrand et al. (2007) document that in Delhi, India, using an
intermediary/agent is the way to get a driving license without actually
learning how to drive, and Drugov et al. (2014) study the role of inter-
mediaries in lowering the moral costs of corruption. Hasker and Okten
(2008) and Bose and Gangopadhyay (2009) provide a theoretical
framework for the role of intermediaries as observed by Bertrand
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licenses but without proper driving skills. It involves a social cost which
is not present in this paper.
In our model, all applicants are “deserving” and we instead study
time costs. Bureaucrats always do their job, in terms of ensuring
that individuals fulﬁll the necessary regulation. This is similar to
what Shleifer and Vishny (1993) termed “corruption without
theft”. However, outright extortion is ruled out. Extortion refers to
the case when bureaucrats charge for doing their job at all and an
individual has to pay an illegal fee to get a document to which he
is legally entitled. Differently, in the case of “speed money”, the op-
tion to stand in line the regular way still exists and the individual
thus has the choice not to bribe. This differentiates “speed money”
from “corruption without theft”.5
This paper relates to the results of Lui (1985), who analyzes the
“Myrdal hypothesis”, i.e. whether bureaucrats have an incentive to
slow down service (Myrdal, 1968). In Lui's model, the bureaucrat
awards a license in a one-step procedure. The bureaucrat chooses a
speed of service, i.e. how fast to process applications, that is neither
too fast – which would leave individuals queuing with too much
surplus, nor too slow – which would make individuals choose not to
queue (and bribe) at all. In our model, bureaucrats do not choose a
speed of service but can instead affect the procedure length, and we
add intermediaries to the analysis. The important additional insight
from the analysis of endogenous red tape is that, with intermediaries,
procedures are unambiguously longer and individuals are unambigu-
ously worse off, as compared to a model with “direct” bribing only.
2. Stylized facts about bureaucracy intermediaries
Different types of bureaucracy intermediaries are common through-
out the developing world. Myrdal (1968) documents their existence
in India. Oldenburg (1987) goes further with a more formal account,
detailing the functions of “brokers”, “touts”, “scribes”, “consolidators”,
“helpers” and “barkers”, within and outside the bureaucracy in a land
consolidation program in Uttar Pradesh. Levine (1975) documents
the existence of intermediaries in the interface between the Ghanaian
bureaucracy and ﬁrms and individuals.
The prevalence of despachantes, used in contacts with the bureau-
cracy in Brazil, is documented by Rosenn (1971) and, froma sociological
and anthropological viewpoint, by DaMatta (1979, 1984). Lawyer and
legal thriller author John Grisham describes the Brazilian despachante
as a “facilitator extraordinaire” that “is an integral part of Brazilian
life” (Grisham, 2005, p. 376). In a comprehensive study entitled “Brazil
is not for amateurs”, Castor describes the despachante (or “dispatcher”)
as “a popular mediator of the relationships between the population
and the state” (Castor, 2002, p. 79). When studying the formalization
of ﬁrms, Stone et al. (1996), Zylbersztajn and Graça (2003) and
Zylbersztajn et al. (2007) provide evidence that using intermediaries
is the most common way of formalizing a ﬁrm in Brazil. Husted
(1994) describes how “coyotes” help individuals obtain a driver's
license in Mexico. Such coyotes are an example of “tramitadores”, a4 Hasker andOkten (2008) analyze the impact of intermediaries on the degree of social-
ly beneﬁcial regulation that is followed, when some bureaucrats accept bribes to reduce
regulation. Bose and Gangopadhyay (2009) analyze the effects of intermediaries on the
amount of undeserving applicants that obtain licenses. In these models, the intermediary
has an informational advantage, in knowing which bureaucrats are corrupt. This provides
a clear rationale for using intermediaries. Hasker and Okten (2008) ﬁnd that traditional
means of combating corruption are less effective or even counterproductive, when there
are intermediaries. Bose and Gangopadhyay (2009) ﬁnd, unsurprisingly, that the amount
of undeserving applicants increases. In addition,with endogenous queue lengths, both un-
deserving and deserving individuals may ﬁnd intermediary services valuable in locating
corrupt (honest) bureaucrats.
5 It should benoted, however, that thedifference between the twobecomes less distinct
when we introduce endogenous red tape, as this is a means of making procedures more
complicated for applicants.more general and widely used term for (mostly) informal intermedi-
aries present in (Spanish-speaking) Latin America, assisting individ-
uals and ﬁrms with procedures at the government bureaucracy
(“tramites”). Proética (2006) documents the degree of individuals' use
of tramitadores in Peru. Lambsdorff (2002) refers to tramitadores help-
ing out with the bureaucracy in El Salvador. Examples of reports
documenting the use of such intermediaries by ﬁrms, at formalization,
are CIET (1998a, 1998b) and IFC (2007b) for Bolivia, CIEN (2001) for
Guatemala, IFC (2008) for Honduras and IFC (2007a) for Peru.6
Gancheva (1999) and Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2013) document
the use of intermediaries by ﬁrms in Bulgaria and Russia,
respectively.
Although none of the papers above, with the possible exception of
Oldenburg (1987), is a speciﬁc study of intermediaries, they point at
the different functions performed. In some settings, the main reason
why individuals use bureaucracy intermediaries seems to be the
intermediary's knowledge of how licensing procedures actually work.
In many countries with large and non-transparent bureaucracies,
actually ﬁnding out what is required in order to get, say, a passport, is
a challenge in itself. Rosenn writes: “The despachante functions effec-
tively because he knows how to ﬁll out the bewildering variety of
forms, to whom the copies should be delivered, and what documenta-
tion will be required” (Rosenn, 1971, p. 537). Honduran ﬁrms claim
that they use tramitadores, at formalization, due to the lack of uniﬁed
information from the authorities regarding the procedure (IFC, 2008).
The same holds in a small sample of micro-enterprises in Guatemala
(CIEN, 2001). For Bulgarian ﬁrms obtaining an operations permit, “the
procedures are not clear, nor are they easily accessible to potential
licenses applicants” (Gancheva, 1999, p. 22).
Time saving in licensing procedures is a related reason why individ-
uals and ﬁrms use intermediaries. The World Bank Enterprise Surveys
on senior management time spent in handling government regulation
requirements conﬁrm that there is a large variation between different
parts of the world. Whereas the high-income OECD average is 4.2% of a
work week, theworld average is 9.8% and the Latin American/Caribbean
average is 12.7% (World Bank, 2012a). Another World Bank report,
studying a few Latin American countries, shows similar values (World
Bank, 1996). The numbers conﬁrm earlier work by de Soto (1989).
By frequent interactions, intermediaries learn how to handle the
procedures at the government ofﬁces and can solve matters faster
than a particular individual or ﬁrm. Processing many applications at
the same time and having personal relations with bureaucrats are addi-
tional reasons why intermediaries possess a “superior technology” and
cost advantage. Furthermore, Stone et al. (1996) and Zylbersztajn and
Graça (2003) indicate that ﬁrms use intermediaries at formalization
because these act much like “one stop shops”. The time saving achieved
thus consists of two parts: for intermediaries at the bureaucracy itself
and for individuals/ﬁrms by eliminating the need to visit multiple
ofﬁces. These two time saving components are made explicit in the
model in this paper.7
Before proceeding with the formal analysis, and to better under-
stand bureaucrats' incentives to create red tape, we need to discuss
the bureaucrat–intermediary interaction and why bureaucrats are able
to capture all or some of the rents of intermediaries. An intermediary6 Another generic name, used in some parts of (Spanish-speaking) Latin America, is
“gestor”.
7 From the supply side, a possible argument for the existence of bureaucracy intermedi-
aries is that the government sanctions the sector as a means of assisting individuals and
ﬁrms with licensing procedures. Such intermediaries then become a “second best” option
in societies where the government is unable to reform its bureaucracy. Another supply-
side argument explaining the phenomenonmay be that intermediaries are easier to work
with for bureaucrats because they “always have their papers in order”. That is, the cost of
handling applications from intermediaries is lower. Bureaucrats would then be able to
serve more customers of the bureaucracy in less time, which would be socially beneﬁcial.
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license applicants and acting on their behalf. It typically handles several
applications from different applicants at the same time. These two
features make the intermediary easily identiﬁable as an intermediary
proper. Think of an intermediary that represents individuals applying
for personal documents or entrepreneurs registering their business,
where the intermediary will carry the IDs and other documents of the
applicants, at the bureaucracy. If it is at the discretion of the bureaucrat
to decide whether and how to handle intermediary applications, it is
implied that the bureaucrat possesses bargaining power vis-à-vis the
intermediary and can capture part of the surplus associated with the
intermediation activity. As this activity is typically informal, neither
illegal nor strictly regulated, bureaucrats will have some discretion in
their transactions with intermediaries. Even if the intermediary func-
tion were completely legal and formalized, which is not the standard
case, there would be some scope for bureaucrats to decide how many
intermediary applications to accept and how promptly to go about in
handling them.8
An example of bureaucrat–intermediary interaction is from Brazil
in general, and the State Department of Transit (DETRAN) in São
Paulo in particular. At these ofﬁces, “despachantes” typically resolve
vehicle-related errands for a number of individuals at the same time,
representing them in their interactionwith the authority. There is abun-
dant anecdotal evidence that such despachantes typically do not stand
in lines, about the hand-over of “gifts” to bureaucrats, but also that
systems are in place that make it possible for despachantes to achieve
time saving not available to individuals. More speciﬁcally, despachantes
have access to some of the information systems and computerized reg-
istries of DETRAN. Whereas an individual has to undertake one extra
step, e.g. go to an ofﬁce to get a register excerpt, the despachante can
handle the same step fromhis ofﬁce.With such access,which is the result
of a very close cooperation between the bureaucracy and despachantes,
these intermediaries possess a true time saving device.
There is evidence, also from other countries than Brazil, that inter-
mediaries work in close collaborationwith bureaucrats or that interme-
diaries are even former bureaucrats. Fjeldstad (2003) presents evidence
that a crack-down on corruption at the Tanzanian tax authority had the
effect that ﬁred bureaucrats instead started working as intermediaries,
using their previous corruption networks. Ankarcrona (2005) reports
that Russian “customsbrokers” are typically former customs employees.
Bertrand et al. (2008) ﬁnd evidence that “agents” in India work in col-
laboration with bureaucrats to circumvent regulation.
3. A model of time-saving, corruption, intermediaries and
endogenous red tape in licensing
Consider a government license that brings a beneﬁt g to any individ-
ual. The license is obtained by going through a procedure of n identical
steps at the government bureaucracy. Each step consists of one visit to
the government bureaucracy, where the individual interacts with a bu-
reaucratwho is amonopolist in this step. The individual pays the ofﬁcial
fee and proceeds to the next step. The bureaucracy has two costs when
handling a license application. First, there is a cost in undertaking the
controls associated with awarding the license, for instance checking
relevant criminal and tax records, etc. It is constant throughout the
paper and we can think of it as deducted from individuals' license
gain, such that g represents the gain after socially relevant controls
have been undertaken. The second cost, p per step, is the bureaucracy's8 As a theoretical case, one could imagine a law stipulating that intermediaries are
completely legal and can represent individuals at the bureaucracy, no upper limit on the
number of applications that can be brought to the bureaucracy and intermediaries having
very low-paid “ofﬁceboys” standing in lines. Thiswouldmake it difﬁcult for bureaucrats to
capture any of the surplus associated with the intermediation activity. It is interesting to
note that the Brazilian bureaucracy reform “Poupatempo”, discussed in Section 4, does
not only prohibit intermediaries but alsomakes it necessary for applicants to get a new ap-
pointment number for each new errand (Paulics, 2003).administrative cost for handling an application. The monetary cost is
thus np, which is the ofﬁcial license fee.
Each step is also associated with a time cost. Individuals, indexed
by i, differ in Ai, the (per-step) opportunity cost of time, which we will
also refer to as “productivity”. The total license cost to individual i is
thus np + nAi, and the net gain g − (np + nAi). Let Ai be uniformly
distributed on the unit interval (0 ≤ Ai ≤ 1), and let the total measure
of individuals be 1.9 If only the regular procedure existed, all individuals
would get the license as long as g− (np + n) ≥ 0, i.e. for n≤ gpþ1. The
amount of licenseswould then fall asn grows, and equal zero atnmax ¼ gp.
As a second option, individuals can get the license by bribing. For
each step, the individual pays a bribe (instead of p), whereby time
costs are reduced by a fraction α, with 0 ≤ α b 1. The gain from bribing
is thus proportional to α. We assume that bureaucrats cannot price
discriminate between individuals with different opportunity costs of
time. This is a central assumption, maintained throughout the paper.
Deﬁne as B the sum of bribe payments at the n identical steps, the net
license gain to individual i then becomes g− (B+ (1− α)nAi).
The third option is to use an intermediary, a “one stop shop” in gov-
ernment licenses. The intermediary removes all bureaucracy-related
time costs for individuals and there is no time cost in the interaction
with the intermediary. The intermediary obtains the license by paying
a bribe Bd to bureaucrats, and charges individuals a license fee d. All
individuals using intermediaries thus realize a net license gain g− d.
Apart from Bd, whichwe refer to as indirect bribes, there are noother
costs for intermediaries at the bureaucracy (in particular, no time costs).
Intermediaries cannot price discriminate between individuals and
bureaucrats cannot price discriminate between intermediaries. Inter-
mediaries set d to maximize proﬁts. Bureaucrats set B and Bd to maxi-
mize proﬁts from direct and indirect demand, incurring license costs
np. We use the assumption of centralized corruption (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1993). Bureaucrats take one joint decision on B and Bd and
split the revenue equally between them.10
The existence and size of the intermediary sector is determined
within the model. We use a standard Cournot model of oligopolistic
competition between identical intermediaries. The intermediary fee
thus entails a mark-up over costs Bd, a mark-up that decreases as
competition increases. The number of intermediaries, deﬁned as m, is
determined by a zero net proﬁt entry condition.11 More speciﬁcally,
the cost to enter is f per step of the licensing procedure, i.e. a total cost
of nf, which is also the proﬁt of each intermediary that enters. This spec-
iﬁcation reﬂects that longer procedures, involving more bureaucrats
and ofﬁces, are more costly for a prospective intermediary to learn.12
The timing is as follows: Bureaucrats choose, in turn, through which
means to accept bribes (direct only, direct and indirect, indirect only),
the optimal length of procedures n (in case we study endogenous red
tape, else n is ﬁxed), and bribes B and Bd. Given bribes, and if Bd≠ ø,
a numberm≥ 1 of intermediarieswill simultaneously and symmetrical-
ly decide to enter and set a license fee d, determined through Cournot
competition, such that each entrant makes zero net proﬁts. Third, indi-
viduals, taking B and d as given, choose if and through which means to
get the license. A subgame perfect equilibrium is derived by backward
induction: direct and indirect license demand are derived, the proﬁt
maximization problem of intermediaries is solved, bureaucrats choose
B and Bd by solving the proﬁt maximization problem for a given n, the
optimal n is derived (in case of endogenous n) and bureaucrats choose
through which means to accept bribes.9 In the last section of the Appendix, we discuss the validity of themain results for other
distributions.
10 Adding a small time cost for individuals when using intermediaries, or for intermedi-
aries at the bureaucracy, would not change the qualitative results of the paper.
11 To avoid analytic complexity, we let m be a continuous variable. Intermediaries exist
iffm ≥ 1.
12 Constant entry costs, as opposed to nf, are discussed at the end of Section 3.3.
Fig. 1. Solution to the bribe-only model. The graph displays, for each license procedure
length n, the amount of licenses (upper solid line), and the distribution of individuals
that get the license through the regular procedure, bribe, or that do not get the license
at all (solid lines). The dot-dashed line (which coincides with the upper solid line for
small n) shows the amount of licenses when only the option of the regular procedure is
available. Parameter values are g= 1, p= 0.1, alpha = 2/3.
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accept direct bribes. This section brings out the main intuition with
respect to time costs, licensing procedure lengths and license gain.
In Section 3.2, the bribe and intermediary subgame is solved and
in Section 3.3 we determine, for each combination of n and f, which
subgame that generates the highest bureaucracy proﬁts. This determines
allocations, optimal proﬁts, whether intermediaries exist and, if applica-
ble, the size of the intermediary sector. With more instruments/bribes/
choices available to bureaucrats, we should expect the highest proﬁts
in the bribe and intermediary subgame, unless some constraint binds
(aswas also pointed out by Hasker and Okten (2008)). The intermediary
only subgame,with indirect bribes only, is indeed optimal only for a very
limited parameter space and is placed in the appendix. In Section 3.4 we
analyze red tape.
3.1. Direct corruption only
Consider the choice between getting the license through bribing and
the regular procedure. Bribing will imply a larger net gain if
g− Bþ 1−αð ÞnAið Þ≥g− npþ nAið Þ i:e: if Ai≥
B−np
αn
: ð1Þ
Individuals with productivity above this threshold thus bribe. An
additional threshold is relevant if n is large. The ofﬁcial procedure
then becomes prohibitively costly for individuals with a large Ai. The
relevant choice is then instead between bribing and not getting the
license at all, i.e. to get the license if the net gain is positive:
g− Bþ 1−αð ÞnAið Þ≥0 i:e: if Ai≤
g−B
1−αð Þn : ð2Þ
Only individuals below this productivity level will get the license.
The condition binds if it is less than 1, the highest productivity level.
With Ai uniformly distributed, total license demand, through bribing,
becomes Min 1; g−B1−αð Þn
n o
−B−npαn . Bureaucrats take a joint decision on the
bribe level B, in order to maximize bribe proﬁts:
Max
B
π ¼ B−npð Þ  Min 1; g−B
1−αð Þn
 
−B−np
αn
 
s:t: B≤ 1−αð Þnpþ αg:
ð3Þ
The constraint ensures that the demand for bribing does not become
negative. As indicated above, the solution to the problem depends on
the length of the procedure n:
B nð Þ ¼
npþ αn
2
if 0≤nb n1 ¼
g
pþ 1−α
2
g− 1−αð Þn if n1≤n b n2 ¼
g
pþ 1− α
2−α
npþ α g−npð Þ
2
if n2≤nb
g
p
:
8>>>><>>>>:
ð4Þ
Werefer to these cases as small-,middle- and large-n, with proﬁts πs,
πm and πl. Fig. 1 displays, for each n, the amount of licenses (upper solid
line), the division between the regular procedure and bribing (lower
solid line), and, for later reference, the amount of licenses when only
the regular procedure exists (dot-dashed line).
- For small values of n, the optimal bribe is such that individuals with
productivity above Ai = 1/2 choose to bribe (plug in npþ αn2 in ex-
pression (1)). Individuals with lower productivity get the license
through the regular procedure. The mark-up over costs np that
bureaucrats charge, i.e. αn2 , is proportional to individuals' gain from
bribing.- In the middle-range, the optimal bribe is such that the highest-
productivity individual (Ai = 1) is indifferent between bribing and
not getting the license at all, i.e. we have 1 ¼ g−B1−αð Þn. This implies
that the optimal bribewill decrease as n increases and that also indi-
viduals with productivity below Ai = 1/2 will bribe.
- For large n, the optimal bribe once again increases with n and the
mark-up is proportional to g− np, the gain minus the bureaucracy's
administrative costs. High-productivity individuals can no longer
afford the license and low-productivity individuals increasingly
switch to bribing as n increases. Both the lower andupper thresholds
converge to zero as n→nmax ¼ gp, the procedure length at which no
individual can afford the license.
We next introduce themeasure of aggregate net license gain used in
the analysis.
Deﬁnition 1. The aggregate net license gain G is the sumof the net gain
for individuals getting the license through the regular procedure, brib-
ing and intermediaries, respectively:
G≡
Z
Bureaucracy
g−np−nAið ÞdAi þ
Z
Bribe
g−B− 1−αð ÞnAið ÞdAi
þ
Z
Intermediary
g−dð ÞdAi:
In these integrals, the integration limits depend on n. In the present
section, there are only the ﬁrst two terms. It is clear from Fig. 1 that the
amount of licenses is greater when the bribe option exists. Some indi-
viduals choose to bribe, and given that the regular procedure is always
an option, Gmust be larger. This is formalized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. The aggregate net license gain G is larger when the option
to bribe exists, than if there is only the regular licensing procedure. No
individual is worse off and some individuals are strictly better off. This
holds irrespective of the parameter values.
All individuals that bribe are better off than when the bribe option
does not exist and the higher the productivity, the larger is the gain
from bribing. Proposition 1 thus states that corruption is good: the
possibility to pay “speed money” means that (some) individuals
get the license at a lower total cost. It is a formalization of the “grease
the wheels” view of corruption (see e.g. Bardhan (1997) and Svensson
(2005)).
Intuitively, G should increase in α, as individuals get a fraction of the
surplus associated with reducing time costs. As stated in Proposition 2,
this is indeed the case, except in the middle n-range.
Fig. 2. Bureaucracy proﬁts (solid, inverted U), individuals' aggregate gain (dot-dashed)
and sum of proﬁts, gain and time costs (upper solid curve), as functions of n. Parameter
values are g= 1, p = 0.1, alpha = 2/3.
261A. Fredriksson / Journal of Development Economics 108 (2014) 256–273Proposition 2. The aggregate net license gain G increaseswith the fraction
α of time costs that bureaucrats can remove, for licensing procedure lengths
nbn1 ¼ gpþ1−α2 and n≥n2 ¼ gpþ1− α2−α , i.e. ∂G∂α N 0. For intermediate licensing
procedure lengths, ∂G∂αb0.
Proof. See the appendix. □
For both small and large n, the optimal bribe is such that a constant
fraction of the surplus associated with time saving is captured by indi-
viduals. This is because bureaucrats cannot price discriminate. An
increase in α implies a larger surplus to be divided between bureaucrats
and individuals, hence ∂G∂αN0. In the middle-n region, the individual with
Ai=1gets an additional time saving of (Δα)nAi=(Δα)n asα increases.
The bribe, g− (1− α)n, is increased accordingly, and bribing individ-
uals with Ai b 1 are therefore worse off. In what follows, we return to
the α-dependence in detail.
3.1.1. Endogenous red tape
So far, we have considered the problem that bureaucrats face when
maximizing revenue from “speed money”, given a licensing procedure.
That is, the implementation of the licensing procedure, i.e. the exact
number of checks and controls, documents to be ﬁlled in, stamps to be
obtained etc., represented by n, has been exogenously determined.
However, if bureaucrats can affect theway inwhich the licensing proce-
dure is implemented, the analysis changes signiﬁcantly. Asmotivated in
the Introduction, we take the view that corrupt bureaucrats, while still
obeying all rules and performing all relevant checks related to awarding
the license, are free to choose how the procedure is implemented. That
is, bureaucrats choose thenumber of steps n of the procedure. Inmaking
this choice, the administrative costs of handling applications, i.e. np, are
incurred.
Fig. 2 shows proﬁts π (solid, inverted U) and gain G (dot-dashed)
from the solution in Eq. (4). The sum of π, G and aggregate time costs
incurred by individuals is also shown (upper solid curve). As long as
all individuals get the license, the sum is g− np. The ﬁgure suggests
that bureaucracy proﬁts are maximized in the middle-n region (i.e. be-
tween the two adjacent markers on the horizontal axis). To show this
formally, we solve the problem in Eq. (3), the only difference being
that n is now a choice variable:
Max
B;n
π ¼ B−npð Þ  Min 1; g−B
1−αð Þn
 
−B−np
αn
 
s:t: B≤ 1−αð Þnpþ αg:
ð5Þ
The problem has a solution only for 1 ¼ g−B1−αð Þn, as proﬁts are strictly
increasing or decreasing in n, for small and large n, respectively.13
We get
B ¼ g− 1−αð Þn; n ¼ gﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ pð Þ 1þ p−αð Þp : ð6Þ
The ﬁrst thing to note about the solution is that the optimal length of
the licensing procedure, n⁎, increases in α. This is because bribing indi-
viduals can realize larger gains from the license as α increases which,
in turn, allows bureaucrats to increase n and thereby the surplus related
to time saving that can be extracted. Thus, when corrupt bureaucrats
can provide larger reductions in time costs for individuals, it is optimal
tomake licensing procedures longer (and, as a result, bureaucracy proﬁts
π⁎ increase). Second, by plugging in (B⁎,n⁎) and the corresponding
threshold between the regular procedure and bribing in Deﬁnition 1,13 The ﬁrst-order condition w.r.t. B is as in Eq. (3). We ﬁrst solve Eq. (3), thenmaximize
proﬁts w.r.t. n.we get that the aggregate individual gain, at the “optimal” procedure
length, decreases in α. We summarize these results below:
Proposition 3. When the licensing procedure length n is endogenous,
both n⁎ and bureaucracy proﬁts π* increase in α, the fraction of time
costs that bureaucrats can remove. The aggregate license gain G(n⁎)
instead decreases in α.
Proof. See the appendix. □
For individuals that do not bribe, it is clear that the increase in n
makes them worse off. The result that also bribers are worse off is
because, at n⁎, the individual with the highest opportunity cost of
time is indifferent between bribing and not getting the license at all.
As α is increased, this individual gains the most. The subsequent
increase in n⁎ needed to again make this individual indifferent implies
that all other bribing individuals will be worse off, as their initial gain
from increasing α was smaller. The result follows from the lack of
price discrimination. The result from Proposition 1, that introducing
speed money corruption increased individuals' license gain, is thus
unambiguously reversed by Proposition 3, i.e. when the licensing proce-
dure length n is endogenous.
Although we have not yet introduced intermediaries, Proposition 3
indicates what the impactwill be: there will bemore red tape, and indi-
viduals will beworse off. Increasingαmeansmore time saving, which is
similar to introducing intermediaries.
3.2. Bribe and intermediary model
Wenowdiscuss the subgame inwhich individuals can either bribe or
use an intermediary, in addition to the regular procedure. The threshold
between the regular procedure and bribing is as in Eq. (1). Individuals
instead prefer intermediaries over bribing if
g−d≥g− Bþ 1−αð ÞnAið Þ i:e: if Ai≥
d−B
1−αð Þn : ð7Þ
As it can never be optimal to have an intermediary fee larger than g,
high-productivity individuals will always get the license, irrespective
of n (bnmax). This is different from Section 3.1, and comes from the as-
sumption that there are no remaining time costs (and that indifferent
individuals get the license). We can thus write demand for intermedi-
aries as Qd ¼ 1− d−B1−αð Þn, and demand for bribing as QB ¼ d−B1−αð Þn−B−npαn .
3.2.1. Intermediaries' entry decision and choice of optimal fee
We use Cournot competition to model the intermediary sector.
Upon entry, an intermediary makes a quantity choice q, taking the
quantity of the other (m − 1) intermediaries, deﬁned as m−1ð Þeq, as
15 For small n, bureaucrats set B and Bd such that the individualwith Ai=1/2 is indifferent
between the regular procedure, bribing, andusing an intermediary. IndividualswithAi b 1/2
thus use the regular procedure, individuals with Ai ≥ 1/2 use intermediaries. For large n,
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used in the proﬁt function q× (d(q)− Bd), to get the intermediary proﬁt
maximization problem:
Max
q
q 1−αð Þnþ B− 1−αð Þn qþ m−1ð Þeq −Bd : ð8Þ
Solving for q as a function of eq, then applying symmetry between
intermediaries, and plugging the optimal q back into d(q), we
get d B;Bd;mð Þ ¼ 1mþ1 1−αð Þnþ Bð Þ þ mmþ1 Bdð Þ. This response function
captures the standard feature of Cournot competition, i.e. a mark-up
over cost Bd that gradually declines as the number of intermediaries,
m, increases. The second condition that determines the intermediary
sector response functions is that per-intermediary proﬁts, i.e. 1m d−Bdð Þ
1− d−B1−αð Þn
	 

, should equal entry costs nf. Solving for m and the pricing
rule d as functions of the bureaucracy bribe levels, we get:
m B;Bdð Þ ¼−1þ
n 1−αð Þ− Bd−Bð Þ
n
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
f 1−αð Þ
p ; d Bdð Þ ¼ Bd þ n ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃf 1−αð Þq : ð9Þ
The number of intermediaries,m, increases in the direct bribe B and
in (1− α), the additional gain of using an intermediary compared to
bribing, and decreases in the indirect bribe Bd and in entry costs f. In
addition, m is constant if B and Bd are proportional to n. Similar to the
bribe only solution in Eq. (4), we will get such a small-n case also with
intermediaries. For larger n, with Bd constrained by the condition that
the intermediary fee cannot exceed g, the number of intermediaries
will instead increase in n.14
3.2.2. Bureaucrats' choice of bribe levels
Bureaucrats choose B and Bd to maximize proﬁts from direct and
indirect demand:
Max
B;Bd
Π ¼ B−npð Þ  d Bdð Þ−B
1−αð Þn −
B−np
αn
 
þ Bd−npð Þ  1−
d Bdð Þ−B
1−αð Þn
 
s:t: d Bdð Þ≤g; m B;Bdð Þ≥1; B≤ 1−αð Þnpþ αd Bdð Þ:
ð10Þ
The constraints are that intermediary fees never exceed g, that
at least one intermediary enters, and that demand for bribing QB is
non-negative.
3.2.2.1. A special case: free entry into the intermediary sector. To illustrate
the effect of introducing intermediaries, we ﬁrst solve the free entry
case and get two corollaries to Propositions 1 and 3. With f = 0, the
intermediary sector is large, in fact m→ ∞, and d = Bd, i.e. there is no
mark-up (from Eq. (9)). We get
B nð Þ ¼ npþ αn
2
;Bd nð Þ ¼ npþ
n
2
if 0≤nbn1 ¼
g
pþ 12
B nð Þ ¼ npþ α g−npð Þ;Bd nð Þ ¼ g if n1 ≤nb
g
p
:
8><>: ð11Þ
All bribes are channeled through intermediaries, which is seen by
plugging in B⁎(n) and Bd⁎(n) in QB, which becomes zero. The surplus
associated with using an intermediary is larger than when bribing,
and there are no “losses” of this surplus due to intermediary sector
entry barriers. Similar to expression (4), there is a small-n case, where14 It can be inferred from Eq. (9) that neither the intermediary sector mark-up, nor per-
intermediary demand, depend on the direct bribe B. The free-entry condition gives that
themark-up (d− Bd) could only increase if demand per intermediary decreasedwhereas,
with Cournot competition, an increase in the mark-up is instead associated with an
increase in per-intermediary demand. The two conditions imply that it is the number of
intermediaries that adjusts as B (and total intermediary sector demand) changes, not
the demand per intermediary.individuals and bureaucrats split the surplus related to the time cost
reduction. For large n, the regular procedure becomes prohibitively
costly and bureaucrats extract the entire surplus from individuals
using intermediaries, by setting Bd = g.15 It follows that, for small n,
the aggregate gain is larger than when there is only the regular proce-
dure and, for large n, individuals are indifferent. We get the following
corollary to Proposition 1:
Corollary 1. The aggregate net license gain G is (weakly) larger when the
option to use intermediaries exists, than if there is only the regular licensing
procedure. No individual is worse off and, for short licensing procedure
lengths, some individuals are strictly better off. This holds irrespective of
the parameter values.
For the endogenous red tape result, we can use Proposition 3,
because the proﬁts fromEq. (11) equal the proﬁts fromEq. (4), if setting
α= 1.16 We know that red tape increases, and the aggregate net gain
decreases, with α. As intermediaries correspond to α= 1, we get:
Corollary 2. There is more red tape, and individuals are unambiguously
worse off, in the model with intermediaries, than with direct corruption
only.
Proof. See the proof to Proposition 3. □
The more time saving that can be offered – with more time saving
being possible when there are bureaucracy intermediaries – the stron-
ger are bureaucrats' incentives to create red tape, the larger is the
bureaucracy, and the worse off are individuals. This is a general result
and holds in a variety of settings: when some but not all bureaucrats
are corrupt, when entry costs are positive and hence direct and indirect
corruption coexist, and for different degrees of intermediary sector
competition, as is shown below.3.2.2.2. The general case. The general solution to Eq. (10), with f N 0,
stated in Eq. (A.3) in the appendix, consists of ﬁve cases, which arise
due to the constraints on d, m and QB. The cases are displayed in Fig. 4,
to which we return below. For small n and f, no constraints bind, direct
and indirect demand are constant, and B, Bd and d, as well as bureaucracy
and intermediary sector proﬁts, increase linearly inn. This is similar to the
small-n cases in Eqs. (4) and (11). The intermediary fee increases in the
licensing procedure length until a threshold-n is reached, above which
d= g binds. An increase in f allows fewer intermediaries to enter, such
thatm= 1 binds above a certain f-threshold. The threshold is constant
for small n (at f 1 ¼ 1−α9 ), whereas for longer procedures, it is a function
of n itself. For large n and large f, the constraints on d and m both bind.
There are thus four cases for which direct bribing and intermediaries
coexist.
For small n, there is an additional threshold (at f 2 ¼ 1−α4 ), above
which only one intermediary can enter and, in addition, the QB-
constraint binds. There is no direct bribing, as this would take away
demand and proﬁts from the intermediary, which would then not be
able to recover the entry costs. Bureaucrats thus set B and Bd such that
QB is exactly zero, there is one intermediary, and no direct bribing. Asbureaucrats “shut down” the direct bribe option by setting a high B, thus channeling all
bribers through intermediaries, and set Bd = g. Individuals with low Ai get the license
through the regular procedure (these are the same individuals that would get the license
had only the regular procedure existed), all other individuals use intermediaries and get
zero surplus. As n approaches nmax, all individuals use intermediaries.
16 By plugging in B∗(n) and Bd∗(n) in Eq. (10), it can be inferred that the solution does not
depend on α (as all corruption is indirect). The solution in Eq. (4) holds algebraically also
for α= 1. It collapses to the small-n and middle-n ranges, with n1∗ = n1∗∗, n2 ¼ gp, and B in
Eq. (4) equals Bd in Eq. (11).
nmax
Bureaucracy profits, 0 < f < f1
nmax
Bureaucracy profits, f1 < f < f2
nmax
Bureaucracy profits, f2 < f < fmax
nmax
Size of intermediary sector, 0 < f < f1
nmax
Size of intermediary sector, f1 < f < f2
nmax
Size of intermediary sector, f2 < f < fmax
A C E
B D F
Fig. 3. Solution as a function of n, for three different entry costs f. Bureaucracy proﬁts (panels A, C, E) and size of the intermediary sector (panels B, D, F). In each proﬁt graph the proﬁts from
the bribe and intermediarymodel (solid), and from the bribe onlymodel, are shown (the latter curve, dashed, remains the same in all three panels). The dotted (auxiliary) line in panels B
and D is m= 1. Parameter values are g= 1, p= 0.1, alpha = 2/3.
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coexist, also for large f.17
3.3. Bureaucracy proﬁts and existence of intermediaries
The ﬁnal step in solving themodel is to compare bureaucracy proﬁts
from Sections 3.1, 3.2 and the intermediary only subgame, solved in
Appendix A.3. Entry costs f can be seen as a “loss” from the system.
Therefore, it is the comparison of the extra proﬁts bureaucrats can
make when intermediaries exist, due to the larger time saving available
to individuals, to the cost of "sustaining" the intermediary sector
(through the effect of f on B, Bd and proﬁts), that determines whether
the sector exists. There are two important thresholds, f2 and fmax. The
former is the threshold above which intermediaries never exist for the
smallest n, the latter is the highest entry cost for which intermediaries
ever exist. Although the bribe only solution for small n is optimal for f
≥ f2, the threshold-n below which the solution applies is smaller than
in the subgames with intermediaries, such that, for larger n, intermedi-
aries exist also for f ≥ f2.
For high enough entry costs, the intermediary only subgame gener-
ates higher small-n proﬁts than in the bribe and intermediary subgame.
In combination with small α bα≈0:42ð Þ, such that bribe only proﬁts
decrease at a small enough n, there is a narrow range of n and f over
which the intermediary only solution is optimal.
Proposition 4, in which 0b f 2befb fb f max for all α ∈ (0,1), character-
izes the existence conditions of the intermediary sector.
Proposition 4A. For all α ∈ (0,1) and for f such that
0 b f b f2, direct bribing and intermediaries coexist for small and inter-
mediate procedure lengths (belowa threshold-n) and there is direct bribing
only, for large n (above the threshold-n);
f2≤ f b fmax, there is direct bribing only, for small n, a lower intermediate
range of n where the intermediary sector exists without direct bribing, and
coexistence of direct bribing and intermediaries for an upper intermediate
range of n. For large n, there is direct bribing only.17 For each level of f, bureaucracy proﬁts will be negative for n close enough to nmax ¼ gp.
For large enough f, the proﬁts will be negative also for small n. However, the solution to
Eq. (10) will then not apply since the proﬁts from the bribe only model will be higher.Proposition 4B. For small enough α bα≈0:42ð Þ and for f∈ ef ; f	 
, the
lower intermediate range of n where the intermediary sector exists without
direct bribing (from the second part of Proposition 4A) is discontinuous,
with a narrow range in between, for which there is direct bribing only.
Proof. See the appendix. □
Figs. 3 and 4 display the solution graphically and Table A1 presents
the complete solution. In Fig. 3, three sets of graphs are shown, with a
different entry cost f for each set of graphs (for constant g, p and α,
with α= 2/3, i.e. the intermediary only solution is never optimal and
Proposition 4B does not apply). The upper panel in each set shows
bureaucracy proﬁts in the bribe and intermediary model (solid), and
the lower panel shows m, the size of the intermediary sector. In each
proﬁt graph, the bribe only model is also shown (this curve, dashed,
remains the same in all three panels). In eachm-graph, the proﬁt com-
parison is explicitly taken into account in that, for each n, bureaucrats'
optimal choice will be whichever of the two settings (bribe and inter-
mediary, or bribe only) that gives the highest proﬁts. Intermediaries
will exist if bureaucracy proﬁts are higher in the bribe and intermediary
model than in the bribe only model.
For low entry costs, 0≤ fb f 1 ¼ 1−α9 , as depicted in panels A–B and
discussed in Section 3.2, the constraint onm never binds and the inter-
mediary sector is large. The size of the sector is constant for small n be-
cause increases in n, which implymore time saving for individualswhen
bribing/using intermediaries, result in bureaucracy bribes, an inter-
mediary fee and bureaucracy and intermediary proﬁts that increase lin-
early in n. Entry costs also increase linearly in n, i.e. the size of the
intermediary sector is constant. For larger n, where d = g binds, the
number of intermediaries increases with the licensing procedure
length. The mark-up in the intermediary sector increases linearly in n,
but as d is constrained to equal g, the beneﬁt of using an intermediary,
and consequently the demand for intermediaries, increases, which
allows m to increase (from expression (9)).
As f increases, with f1 ≤ f b f2, the constraint on m binds for small n,
but is then relaxed (panels C–D). For small n, and as in panels A–B,
bureaucracy proﬁts are higher with intermediaries, ensuring the exis-
tence of the sector. The proﬁts are smaller than in panels A–B; however,
the intermediary sector is smaller and does not exist for as high n.
Fig. 4. Solution in (n, f) — space. The ﬁve areas in the graph correspond to the (n, f) —
parameter space where each of the solutions to the bribe and intermediary model have
highest proﬁts. The intermediary sector coexists with direct bribing for four of the ﬁve
different solutions. The area marked in gray, for which QB = 0, is the exception. Outside
of the ﬁve areas, i.e. above the uppermost curve, the optimal solution is the bribe only
solution (m= 0). Parameter values are g= 1, p= 0.1, alpha = 2/3.
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istence of intermediaries too costly for bureaucrats for small n, i.e. setting
Bd (and B) such that at least one intermediary can enter is less proﬁtable
than operatingwithout intermediaries. As bribing only allows individuals
a time saving of a fraction α, however, bureaucracy proﬁts will start
declining for a smaller n, as compared to the bribe and intermediary
model, which is still optimal for a middle-range of n. As f approaches
fmax, the range over which the intermediary sector exists shrinks to zero.
Fig. 4 displays the solution in (n,f)— space, for the same values of g, p
and α. The ﬁve areas correspond to the different cases in Eq. (A.3). As
discussed above, the intermediary sector exists for small n as long as f
is not too large, m = 1 binds as f becomes large enough and, given f,
the sector ceases to exist for large enough n. Furthermore, it is in the
middle-range of n that the highest entry costs can be sustained, where
the time saving from using an intermediary is substantial, yet costs np,
unavoidable for bureaucrats, are not too high. An increase in α, which
reduces the difference in time saving between using an intermediaryFig. 5. Solutionwhenn is endogenous, as a function of the entry cost f (solid line). Bureaucracyp
of the intermediary sector (D). The dashed line shows proﬁts, gain and length of the procedure f
are longer and individuals are worse off, when the bribe and intermediary solution is optimal.and bribing, gives a similar-shaped curve, but compressed towards
zero, as lower entry costs can now be sustained. All f-thresholds in the
model converge to zero as α→ 1, as bribing then provides the same
beneﬁt as intermediaries. A reduction in α gives the opposite effect.
For almost the entire (n,f) — parameter space where intermediaries
exist, there is also direct bribing. The exception is the gray area in
Fig. 4, for which all bribing is indirect, i.e. channeled through the inter-
mediary sector. Other values of α give a similarly small such area. Only
for large f and small α is the intermediary only subgame ever optimal,
slightly modifying the gray area (Proposition 4B, Table A1).
A ﬁnal note in this section relates to entry costs. If these had been
speciﬁed as constant, rather than as a function of n, we would never
have intermediaries for the smallest n, as it would not be possible to
recover the entry costs. For large enough n, we would get one interme-
diary, and then an increase in m for increasing n, over the range where
intermediaries exist. The results with respect to endogenous license
lengths and individuals' gain from licensing would not change with
this alternative speciﬁcation.3.4. Endogenous red tape and individuals' gain from licensing
We now turn to the optimal choice of n. As the intermediary only
model never generates the highest proﬁts when n is endogenous (see
proof to Proposition 5), we compare the bribe only and the bribe and
intermediary models. As may be guessed from Fig. 3, the licensing pro-
cedure length that maximizes proﬁts, n⁎, is always larger in the bribe
and intermediary model. In this model, proﬁts are maximized in the
n-range for which d = g. For small f, below a threshold f⁎, we have
m N 1 at the optimum, for larger f we have m = 1. Above a second
threshold f⁎⁎, the bribe only solution is optimal. Panel E of Fig. 3 was
constructed to get equal proﬁts in the two models, for higher entry
costs we thus have the bribe only solution. Not surprisingly, the inter-
mediary sector is smaller and less competitive, at the proﬁt maximum,
the larger is f. Importantly, the aggregate license gain G is always small-
er when the bribe and intermediary model determines the optimal
choice of n. These assertions are summarized in Proposition 5, where
0 b f ⁎ b f ⁎⁎ b fmax for all α ∈ (0, 1), p ≥ 0, and illustrated in Fig. 5.roﬁts (panel A), aggregate individual gain (B), length of the licensing procedure (C) and size
or the bribe only solution. The ﬁgure shows that bureaucracy proﬁts are higher, procedures
Parameter values are g= 1, p= 0.1, alpha = 2/3.
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optimal endogenous n-solution, which is for entry costs 0 ≤ f b f⁎⁎, there
are unambiguously higher bureaucracy proﬁts and more red tape, and
individuals are unambiguously worse off than when there is direct bribing
only,which is for f≥ f⁎⁎. In addition, for 0≤ f b f⁎, an increase in entry costs
results in shorter licensing procedures, larger aggregate net gain, and a
smaller intermediary sector. For f⁎ ≤ f b f⁎⁎ an increase in f has an ambig-
uous effect on the licensing procedure length and the aggregate net gain,
and m= 1.
Proof. See the appendix. □
Proposition 5 states that we get longer licensing procedures
and individuals that are worse off, whenever intermediaries exist.
Whereas “direct” corruption incentivizes bureaucrats to complicate
licensing procedures, which makes individuals worse off, intermedi-
aries further strengthen this incentive, making individuals even
worse off. The proposition also details the prerequisites for this situa-
tion to arise, which is as long as the intermediary sector entry costs
are not too high. Proposition 5 sends a strongmessage, in that time sav-
ing institutions such as bureaucracy intermediaries, which supposedly
beneﬁt citizens facing a complicated bureaucracy, can instead have
the opposite effect.
Fig. 5 shows optimal bureaucracy proﬁts (panel A), aggregate
individual gain (panel B), the optimal licensing procedure length
(panel C) and the size of the intermediary sector (panel D), as a function
of f, for constant values of g, p and α (solid lines). The dashed line corre-
sponds to the bribe only model. The ﬁgure shows that bureaucracy
proﬁts are higher, licensing procedures are longer and individuals are
worse off, when the bribe and intermediary solution is optimal. In addi-
tion, for 0≤ f b f⁎, lower entry costs into intermediation result in a larger
intermediary sector, higher bureaucracy proﬁts, longer procedures and
less gain from licensing.18 In addition, low intermediary entry costs, due to transparent procedures, would prob-
ably also imply low costs for individuals (which could bemodeled as a compression of the
Ai-distribution towards zero).4. Discussion
This paper suggests a theory of bureaucracy intermediaries, which
are common inmany developing countries. In a model where the inter-
mediary sector arises from bureaucrats' maximization of rents from a
licensing procedure, the paper addresses a topic with very few previous
studies. A ﬁrst straightforward result is that if the entry costs to become
an intermediary are low, the intermediary sector is large, competitive,
and exists for short as well as longer licensing procedures. The evidence
provided in Section 2 suggests that low entry costs are likely to be the
case in both the Indian and Brazilian contexts, where there are interme-
diaries for many different types of government services. If the entry
costs to become an intermediary are instead high, if the intermediation
activity is restricted, made more difﬁcult, or is better controlled, the
intermediary sector should only be expected to emerge, if at all, for
longer licensing procedures (as opposed to the shortest ones). A second
result is that, for almost all combinations of licensing procedure lengths
and entry costs, bureaucracy intermediaries should be expected to
coexist with direct bribing, rather than as the only option to speed up
processes and grease thewheels. Figs. 3 and 4 capture these predictions
of the model.
How should such entry costs be interpreted, however? One inter-
pretation is that it is costly to learn and understand how a licensing
procedure works, what documents are required, how to ﬁll them
in, etc. It may require legal training to understand the intricacies of
procedures and different cases that can arise in the handling of appli-
cations. If there are different authorities involved in a licensing pro-
cedure, different documents/certiﬁcates/stamps required at each
step, combined with many exceptions to rules, loopholes and work-
arounds, it seems reasonable to assume that the entry costs are a
function of the complexity of procedures. However, it is not a prioriclear how such costs would differ between countries with equally
long procedures say.18
Another interpretation is that f represents some aspect of policy,
perhaps rules and regulations, that restrict the possibility of intermedi-
aries to represent individuals and ﬁrms at the bureaucracy, or more
effective corruption controls. If enforcement vis-à-vis the sector is
positively correlated with (country) income, we should expect less of
intermediaries in richer countries, and if at all, only for longer licensing
procedures. The reading of the available literature suggests that bureau-
cracy intermediaries are common in many developing countries, and
much less common in richer countries.
In many parts of Latin America, tramitadores are neither legal nor
strictly illegal, but their presence and ability to operate outside and
inside government ofﬁces mean that there is a de facto acceptance
and/or lack of enforcement towards the intermediation activity.
This suggests that bureaucrats and tramitadores operate in close
connection, and that bureaucrats facilitate the intermediation activ-
ity (“f is low”).
In Brazil, despachantes are recognized as a professional category,
formalized training exists, there are trade unions and despachantes
have the right to formally represent citizens and operate inside some
government departments. An example is the above mentioned Depart-
ment of Transit, DETRAN, in São Paulo, and in other Brazilian states.
Traditionally, buying, owning and selling vehicles involves a large
number of legal requirements and, consequently, interactions with the
government bureaucracy. This is costly, money- and time-wise. How-
ever, the existence of despachantes, the recognition of such intermedi-
aries to handle vehicle matters at the bureaucracy, their preferential
access, and other aspects of the bureaucracy–intermediary interaction,
are there to simplify.
If we view the licensing procedure as exogenous, such intermedi-
aries and supporting institutions de facto simplify and make citizens
better off, as compared to going through the regular procedure. This
is the essence of Proposition 1 (and Corollary 1). If we instead believe
the licensing procedure to be endogenously determined, the paper
suggests a theory for how an institutional setting, with a large and
complicated bureaucracy, many intermediaries, close bureaucracy–
intermediary interaction, the right for intermediaries to represent
citizens and intermediaries' preferential access at the bureaucracy,
has emerged. Propositions 3 and 5 (and Corollary 2) establish the
negative effects on individuals' license gain from such endogenous
red tape.
It follows from Proposition 5 that we should observe a positive cor-
relation between having a sector of bureaucracy intermediaries and the
length/complexity of licensing procedures. Due to lack of data on the
prevalence of intermediaries in different countries, this prediction is
difﬁcult to test. However, the model presents one channel, out of
many possible, that can potentially explain the high correlations
observed between corruption and the size of bureaucracy. The corre-
lation between the country rankings of “Ease of Doing Business”,
which is a measure of bureaucratic complexity, from the World
Bank, and the “Corruption Perceptions Index”, from Transparency In-
ternational, is around 0.8. Although these indices are, at best, proxies
for our model variables (n and Π, respectively), the following chan-
nel to create such a correlation is suggested here: Bureaucrats seek
to maximize the revenue from bribes ⇒ Bureaucrats seek to be
able to reduce the time costs at the bureaucracy more effectively,
which is facilitated by the presence of intermediaries⇒ The more
effective the intermediary sector is in reducing time costs at the bu-
reaucracy, the stronger is the incentive for bureaucrats to complicate
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proﬁts, Π, increase.19
Themutually beneﬁcial cooperation between bureaucrats and inter-
mediaries may also involve other professions such as notaries public
and potentially accountants, beneﬁting from a cumbersome regulation.
Reforms of the government bureaucracy typicallymeet ﬁerce resistance
from such groups. In Peru, notaries public have opposed and attempted
to reverse simpliﬁcations in land titling and property rights registration
(ILD, 2007). As a Brazilian example of such reform resistance, trade
unions of despachantes in São Paulo have lobbied vis-à-vis politicians
to limit, delay or hinder bureaucracy simpliﬁcation reforms such
as the government “one stop shop” Poupatempo (Lima, 2005a,
2005b). The reform is likely to considerably have reduced the use of
despachantes over the past decade.20 The following citation from
Castor (2002) further illustrates the mechanisms studied in this paper.
The author discusses various waves of Brazilian bureaucracy reforms,
from the 1930s until the 1990s, the citation concerns the reform efforts
by the head of the “Extraordinary Ministry for Debureaucratization”,
Helio Beltrão, in the early 1980s (pp. 171–172).
Beltrão's approach was basically to concentrate the efforts of his team on the sim-
pliﬁcation of theday-to-day life of thepopulation andof business through the elim-
ination of hundreds of unnecessary or redundant documents in bidding
procedures, the ﬁnancing and mortgaging of houses, the issuance of personal doc-
uments such as driver licenses, and similar everyday transactions. Even if some of
the "simpliﬁcations" of Beltrão survived and were incorporated in the
administrative praxis, a large number of his innovations were quietly eliminated
by the actions of bureaucrats who had lost their power to complicate others' lives.
They were helped by groups of professionals like “dispatchers” and public notaries
who had lost a substantial part of their business due to the reduction in require-
ments for documentation, signatures and stamps.
In this paper, some evidence of the mode of operation of the inter-
mediary sector in Latin America, and in Brazil in particular, is presented,
and several of the papers cited provide insights from India. These are
two countries where intermediaries are common and where proce-
dures at the government bureaucracy are burdensome (Brazil ranks
130th and India 132nd in the overall Doing Business ranking (World
Bank, 2012b)). However, data collection and empirical studies on the
prevalence of bureaucracy intermediaries in different countries, for
which government authorities and licensing procedures intermediaries
aremost common, how intermediaries typically operate, and if and how
the phenomenon decreases with development, are needed to provide
basic data about the sector. This could potentially also allow for a valida-
tion of the endogenous red tape argument presented.
Themodel predicts that individuals increasingly resort to intermedi-
aries when licensing procedures become more complex. Better data on19 It should also be notedhere that both the size of bureaucracy and the extent of corrup-
tion are highly (negatively) correlated with country income: the correlation coefﬁcients
between either of the indices above, with GDP/capita, is around 0.75 in absolute value.
These facts underline the development aspect of addressing issues related to bureaucracy
and corruption. The data sources are World Bank (2012b), Transparency International
(2012) and IMF (2012). There are 172 countries with Doing Business, Corruption and
GDP/capita data, which were used to calculate the correlation coefﬁcients. The Corruption
Perceptions Index, which runs from 1 to 10, was converted into a simple ranking of coun-
tries, with the least corrupt country ranked ﬁrst. For GDP/capita, countries were ranked
from low to high income.
20 For details on Poupatempo, see Annenberg (2006) and Paulics (2003). The magazine
“Despachante em foco” (Despachante in focus) from the trade union of “Despachantes
documentalistas” in São Paulo state discusses issues of concern for the bureaucracy inter-
mediary sector. The topics discussed include efforts to get access to the computerized reg-
istries of the transport authorities, technical changes to this system, the opening of a
“Central de atendimento ao despachante” (Despachante service desk) in conjunctionwith
a DETRAN building, to change the classiﬁcation of the profession in the Brazilian Occupa-
tion Classiﬁcation and to revoke a law thatmakes control of the profession a state (and not
a federal)matter (SINDESP, 2012). It should bementioned that, at present, DETRAN in São
Paulo is being reformed, one aim being to provide amore transparent bureaucracy, anoth-
er to reduce citizens' dependence on intermediaries.intermediary usage could therefore complement studies such as Doing
Business in that de facto procedures that citizens follow may differ
largely from de jure procedures (de Soto, 1989).
Reforms such as Poupatempo, which physically co-locate many
government authorities, may provide a possibility to test the relevance
of the theory presented. As opposed to recent papers on bureaucracy
intermediaries (Hasker and Okten, 2008; Bose and Gangopadhyay,
2009), which focus on intermediaries' role in facilitating rule-breaking,
this paper stresses the time-saving aspect. In the Poupatempo example,
citizens can typically access the different authorities required to get a li-
cense at the same location, visit the authorities on the same day and/or
make fewer trips, and have the license completed, from start to ﬁnish, in
less time. However, the procedure to get the license per se, i.e. the rules
and regulations that must be fulﬁlled, have not changed. These are
the same as if the citizen uses the traditional procedure (which still
exists). Ceteris paribus, the reform should thus weaken the incentive
to use an intermediary for time saving purposes. If the new bureau-
cracy is free from corruption, citizens that cannot fulﬁll the rules
and regulations have the same incentive as previously to use inter-
mediaries. With data on intermediary usage pre- and post reform,
for treatment and control groups, reforms such as Poupatempo pres-
ent a possibility to further understandwhich function intermediaries
primarily perform.
Studying bureaucracy intermediaries, it is worth mentioning the
work of the Brazilian anthropologist Roberto DaMatta, with studies of
the Brazilian social hierarchy (DaMatta, 1979, 1984). The importance
of personal contacts with bureaucrats in order to get things accom-
plished can be interpreted as a potential determinant of entry costs to
become an intermediary. Intermediaries need to cultivate such contacts
in order to be able to effectively handle license applications on behalf
of individuals. In societies characterized by a rules-based treatment
and impersonal contacts between users of the bureaucracy (citizens,
ﬁrms) and neutral ofﬁcials, it is probablymore difﬁcult for a sector of in-
termediaries to emerge. This descriptionwould correspond to a “high f”.
Obviously, there may be deeper underlying explanatory factors for the
importance of personal contacts and the prevalence of bureaucracy
intermediaries. Notwithstanding, it is interesting that Latin America,
the region of the world where senior management of ﬁrms spends
most time on government regulation (see Section 2), also has a preva-
lence of bureaucracy intermediaries.
DaMatta describes a citizen–bureaucrat interaction which is very
different from the “Weberian” case (DaMatta, 1984). Simplifying a com-
prehensive account but still closely following the author: A citizen arriv-
ing at the government bureaucracy is “someonewho is no-one” (alguém
que é ninguém), or just “some individual” (indivíduo qualquer), and solv-
ing his errand is “not possible” (não pode). However, it might be that a
personal link between the bureaucrat and the individual is discovered
(having studied at the same institution, being from the same city, hav-
ing the same favorite team, having religion in common, etc.), which
might facilitate a “ﬁx” (jeitinho) in order to solve the errand. Such per-
sonal ties are not always there, however, and the citizen may resort to
a despachante. This professional intermediary, which has arisen as a
result of the mismatch between the law and daily life, is the specialist
at establishing contacts with the public ofﬁces, in resolving issues and
in obtaining a jeitinho from the authorities. DaMatta thus argues that
personal ties are important and even though some or most citizens do
not have them, there is room for specialists in such personal ties to
develop. These intermediaries will act as mediators in the hierarchy
between the law/bureaucracy and ordinary citizens.
4.1. Policy interventions to reduce red tape
In conclusion, we discuss policy interventions to reduce red tape. In
the model, bureaucrats accept bribes in order to reduce individuals'
time costs, either directly, or through intermediaries. We have taken
as given the principal–agent relationship between bureaucrats and the
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licensing procedures and pocket the bribes charged. Continuing with
these assumptions, and focusing on the effects of indirect corruption
and intermediaries (think of the intermediary only model), what poli-
cies can reduce such intermediary-induced red tape?
Consider ﬁrst competition in the intermediary sector. For an exoge-
nous licensing procedure,more competition increases individuals' license
gain, while for an endogenous procedure the gain instead decreases. Less
competition (through a more regulated entry) thus implies that citizens
are better off in the endogenous-n outcome, but it comes at the price of
a higher intermediarymark-up, reducing thebeneﬁt of having intermedi-
aries, for any given n. A penalty on bureaucrats for handling applications
from intermediaries has a similar effect. It will increase the indirect bribe
Bd and the intermediary fee d. Licensing procedures will be shorter and
individuals will be better off in the endogenous-n outcome, but again at
the cost of less intermediary competition.
The origin of the intermediary-induced red tape is time costs, such as
those related to going between different bureaucracy ofﬁces, that (only)
intermediaries can remove. These time costs increase when steps are
added, the willingness to pay for intermediary services increases, and
individuals get less license gain. Consider the effects of a reform such
as Poupatempo, which effectively establishes a parallel procedure.
That is, individuals can get the license in either the “old” or the “new”
bureaucracy. Intermediaries are prohibited at Poupatempo and, from
the currently available evidence, no corruption stories have emerged
at Poupatempo. That is, assume that there is no corruption in the new
bureaucracy. Assume that a licensing procedure has a socially optimal
length of ns, i.e. ns is the number of steps necessary to undertake all so-
cially relevant controls to award a license. Let g and p be the same in the
old and the new bureaucracy. Any increase in the procedure length at
the old bureaucracy, above ns, will shift all demand from individuals
going through the regular procedure to the new bureaucracy. The old
bureaucracy then only handles applications through intermediaries. Im-
portantly, the threshold in Eq. (A.4) changes to d−nspns . This implies that
old bureaucracy bribe proﬁts decrease for n N ns, i.e. the proﬁts peak at
ns. Thus, there is no incentive to create red tape. Interestingly, the new
bureaucracy now handles all individuals with a low opportunity cost
of time, the old bureaucracy handles all individualswith a high opportu-
nity cost.2121 Anecdotally, this corresponds to experiences at Poupatempo, which has been argued to beAssume that the cost of implementing a parallel procedure is pro-
portional to the licensing procedure length, i.e. C1 × ns. The beneﬁt to in-
dividuals comes from removing red tape, equalingG(ns)−G(n⁎),which
decreases in ns. The reform is beneﬁcial if
C1  nsbG nsð Þ−G n
 
: ð12Þ
Implementing a parallel procedure is thus beneﬁcial for licensing
procedure lengths (ns) that are “short enough”. When a longer proce-
dure is socially motivated, there is less to gain compared to the
endogenous-n outcome and the implementation is more costly.
Poupatempodoesmore than put up a parallel procedure, however. It
also physically co-locates different government authorities and estab-
lishes opening hours and other institutional features such that the indi-
vidual is typically able to resolve the errand in one single visit. With one
visit only, the threshold in Eq. (A.4) changes to d−nsp1 . This increases the
gain from the license reform, as the outside option for individuals using
the old bureaucracy further improves. It should be noted, however, that
although the new bureaucracy consists of only one physical location,
which should lower the costs, the coordination required in order to
co-locate authorities that have typically worked separately, and estab-
lishing a common back-ofﬁce ensuring a speedy treatment, is a big chal-
lenge. A cost function that is quadratic in n, rather than linear, might be
motivated. On the other hand, reforms such as Poupatempo establish
many different procedures at the same location, meaning that the
costs are shared. Paulics (2003) and Mota Prado and da Matta Chasin
(2011) discuss challenges of the Poupatempo implementation.
5. Conclusion
This paper presents a model of bureaucracy intermediaries, where
the sector arises endogenously as a result of bureaucrats' maximization
of rents from a licensing procedure, and evidence on the mode of oper-
ation of such intermediaries. The paper provides one explanation why
licensing procedures tend to be long in developing countries. An
empirical study that can potentially validate different theories of inter-
mediaries, as well as effects of policies aimed at reducing red tape, are
discussed.Appendix A
Appendix A.1. Proofs to the bribe only model in Section 3.1
Proof of Proposition 2. Using the solution in Eq. (4) and Deﬁnition 1, we get G(n) and ∂G nð Þ∂α :
G nð Þ; ∂G nð Þ∂α ¼
g þ n
8
−4−8pþ αð Þ; n
8
if 0≤nbn1 ¼
g
pþ 1−α2
g2−2gn 1þ p−αð Þ þ n2 1þ pð Þ2−α 1þ 2pð Þ
	 

2nα
;− g−n−npð Þ
2
2nα2
if n1≤nbn

2 ¼
g
pþ 1− α2−α
g−npð Þ2 4−3αð Þ
8n 1−αð Þ ;
g−npð Þ2
8n 1−αð Þ2 if n

2≤nb
g
p
:
8>>>><>>>>:
ðA:1Þ
The derivate is positive for small and large n and negative in the middle-n region. □“pro-poor”. The distributional impact of Poupatempo should be further studied, however.
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w.r.t. α, and simplifying, we get
∂πm nð Þ
∂α ¼
g 1þ pð Þ 2 1þ pð Þ−α−2 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ1þ pð Þ 1þ p−αð Þp 
α2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ pð Þ 1þ p−αð Þp
∂G nð Þ
∂α ¼−g 1þ pð Þ
4 1þ pð Þ3−6α 1þ pð Þ2 þ α2 2þ 3pð Þ−4 1þ pð Þ 1þ p−αð Þ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ1þ pð Þ 1þ p−αð Þp
4α2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ pð Þ 1þ p−αð Þð Þ3
q
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∂πm nð Þ
∂α is N0 (we use the Arithmetic Mean–Geometric Mean inequality, AM–GM, i.e.
1þpð Þþ 1þp−αð Þ
2 ≥
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ pð Þ 1þ p−αð Þp ). The denominator of the
large parenthesis in ∂G n
ð Þ
∂α is N0. Replacing
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ pð Þ 1þ p−αð Þp with 1þpð Þþ 1þp−αð Þ2 in the numerator, we get pα2, which is N0, yet less than the original
numerator (AM–GM), i.e. ∂G n
ð Þ
∂α b 0. □
Appendix A.2. Solution to the bribe and intermediary model in Eq. (10)
There are ﬁve distinct solutions, depending on which of the constraints that bind. There is an (n,f)-parameter space over which each solution
holds, as indicated for each case.
no constraints bind
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B ¼ npþ αn
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nd¼g ¼ gpþ 12 þ 12
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
f 1−αð Þp ; n′d¼g ¼ gpþ 1−α2− ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃf 1−αð Þp ; n″d¼g ¼ gpþ 1− ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃf1−αp
n−thresholds; for different levels of f ; above which d ¼ g bindsð Þ
nm¼1 ¼ g
pþ 1− 2þ αð Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
f
4 1−αð Þ
q
n−threshold; below which m ¼ 1 bindsð Þ
:
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
ðA:3Þ
The solution is displayed in Fig. 4 where each area corresponds to one of the above solutions. The comparison with bribe only proﬁts has been
taken into account in that, above the upper curve, the optimal solution is the bribe only model (see the main text).
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When bureaucrats only accept indirect bribes, the set-up follows the same logic as in the other subgames. Individuals prefer intermediaries over
the regular procedure if
g−d≥g− npþ nAið Þ i:e: if Ai≥
d−np
n
ðA:4Þ
such that demand for intermediaries is 1−d−npn . Using the same reasoning as in Section 3.2.1, the expressions that determinem and the pricing rule d
become
m B;Bdð Þ ¼−1þ
n− Bd−npð Þ
n
ﬃﬃﬃ
f
p ; d Bdð Þ ¼ Bd þ n ﬃﬃﬃfp : ðA:5Þ
Finally, bureaucrats maximize proﬁtsΠI from indirect bribes (where index I indicates the intermediary only model) subject to the constraints on
m and d, hence solving
Max
Bd
ΠI ¼ Bd−npð Þ  1−
d Bdð Þ−np
n
 
s:t: d Bdð Þ≤g; m B;Bdð Þ≥1: ðA:6Þ
Similar to the bribe and intermediary model, there are distinct solutions, depending on the constraints, and an (n,f)-parameter space over which
each case holds.
no constraints bind
f ≤ 1
9
; 0≤nb g
pþ 1
2
1þ
ﬃﬃﬃ
f
p	 

Bd ¼ d−n
ﬃﬃﬃ
f
p
d ¼ npþ n
2
þ n
ﬃﬃﬃ
f
p
2
; m ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
4 f
s
−1
2
d ¼ g binds
f ≤ 1
9
;
g
pþ 12 1þ
ﬃﬃﬃ
f
p	 
≤ nbnmax and f N 19 ; nId¼g≤nbnmax
Bd ¼ g−n
ﬃﬃﬃ
f
p
d ¼ g; m ¼ 1þ p− g
n
	 
 ﬃﬃﬃ1
f
s
m ¼ 1 binds
f N
1
9
; 0≤nbnId¼g
Bd ¼ d−n
ﬃﬃﬃ
f
p
d ¼ npþ n−n
ﬃﬃﬃ
f
p
;m ¼ 1
where :
nId¼g ¼
g
pþ 1−
ﬃﬃﬃ
f
p
:
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
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Appendix A.4. Proofs to the full model in Sections 3.3–3.4
Proof of Propositions 4A and 4B. We compare bureaucracy proﬁts from the solutions in expressions (4) (bribe only), (A.3) (bribe and
intermediary) and (A.7) (intermediary only). In the ﬁrst three paragraphs below, we establish the comparison between the solutions in
Eqs. (4) and (A.3). The n-thresholds referred to, but not stated, are given below the text.22
For small n, bureaucracy proﬁts in the bribe only model are πs ¼ nα4 . In the bribe and intermediary model, the proﬁts are Πs ¼ n4 1þð f−
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
f 1−αð Þ
p
Þ for f ≤ f 1 ¼ 1−α9 and Πs;m¼1 ¼ n α4−2 f þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
f 1−αð Þ
p	 

for f 1≤ fb f 2 ¼ 1−α4 . Both are larger than πs in their respective f-ranges. The
bureaucracy and intermediary large-n solution for f b f1 has proﬁts Πl ¼ g−npð Þ nþnp−gð Þn þ αnf4 − nþ np−gð Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
f 1−αð Þp which equal large-n
proﬁts in the bribe only model, πl ¼ α g−npð Þ
2
4 1−αð Þn , at n ¼ n πl¼Πlð Þ, which is thus the upper intersection between the proﬁt curves. In the [f1, f2)-22 The sub-indexon bribe only proﬁts π indicateswhether it is the small-,middle-, or large-n solution. Theﬁrst sub-indexon bribe and intermediary proﬁts, and intermediary only proﬁts,
indicates whether it is the small- or large-n solution (where d b g for small n and d = g for large n). Sub-indices m = 1, and m = 1, QB = 0, respectively, indicate the other binding
constraints.
270 A. Fredriksson / Journal of Development Economics 108 (2014) 256–273interval the crossing between Πl,m = 1 (large-n proﬁts when m = 1 binds) and Πl is always at nbn πl¼Πlð Þ, which implies that n πl¼Πlð Þ is the
upper threshold between bribe only and bribe and intermediary proﬁts, also for [f1,f2).
For f≥ f2, bureaucracy proﬁts areΠs;m¼1;QB¼0 ¼ n
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
f
1−α
q
− 2−α1−α f
 
in the bribe and intermediary model (up to nd = g′′ , from Eq. (A.3)). The proﬁts
are less than πs (which holds up to n1∗ , from Eq. (4)) and, in addition, n1∗ b nd˝ = g. For n≤ n1∗ we thus always have the bribe only solution when f≥ f2.
There will, however, be an n-interval above n1∗ , with the bribe and intermediary solution. The lower intersection can fall in the region of middle-n or
large-n proﬁts from the bribe only solution (from Eq. (4)). In the middle-n region, the lower intersection is at n πm¼Πs;m¼1;QB¼0ð Þ for f 2≤ fb
1−αð Þ −2þα 3−2αð Þ−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2−αð Þ 2þα −5þ4αð Þð Þ
p 
2 −2þαð Þ3 and, above n2
∗ (from Eq. (4)), for larger f (up to f max ¼ 8þ4 2−αð Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1−αð Þ5
p
−α 24−α 29−α 17−4αð Þð Þð Þ
8−α 11−4αð Þð Þ2 ), at n πl¼Πs;m¼1;QB¼0ð Þ .
As both n πm¼Πs;m¼1;QB¼0ð Þ and n πl¼Πs;m¼1;QB¼0ð Þ represent the n above which the bribe and intermediary solution is optimal, and as there is no change
with respect to the constraints in Eq. (10), both thresholds are referred to as n in Table A1.
For fb f 3 ¼ 4 1−αð Þ4−αð Þ2, which lies in the (f2,fmax)-interval, the upper intersection is n πl¼Πlð Þ, from above. For f≥ f3, the upper intersection is where
m = 1 binds. We have Πl;m¼1 ¼ g−n 1−αþpð Þð Þ nþnp−gð Þαn þ
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
f 1−αð Þ
p
nþnp−gð Þ
α −
nf 1þαð Þ
α , and the intersection is n πl¼Πl;m¼1ð Þ . fmax solves n πl¼Πs;m¼1;QB¼0ð Þ ¼
n πl¼Πl;m¼1ð Þ.
In sum, for f b f2, we have the bribe and intermediary solution for0≤nbn πl¼Πlð Þ and the bribe only solution forn πl¼Πlð Þ≤nbnmax ¼ gp. For f2≤ f b fmax,
we have the bribe and intermediary solution for an intermediate-n range. The (QB = 0)-constraint ﬁrst binds, but is relaxed, as n increases.
We now compare with the intermediary only model (in Eq. (A.7)), ﬁrst proving that it will never apply for small n. For fb19, bureaucracy
proﬁts are ΠIs ¼ n4 1þ f−2
ﬃﬃﬃ
f
p	 

, and for f ≥ 19, the proﬁts are ΠIs;m¼1 ¼ n
ﬃﬃﬃ
f
p
−2 f
	 

. We compare these with the above established Πs and Πs,
m = 1, for f ≤ f1 and f1 ≤ f b f2, respectively. The (f,α) parameter space where intermediary only proﬁts are largest is always outside the
applicable parameter space, and the n-thresholds below which these solutions apply are smaller for the intermediary only model. Comparing
with bribe only proﬁts πs, for fb19, gives Πs
I N πs only in a parameter space where the bribe and intermediary solution applies and has a higher
proﬁt, comparingΠs,m = 1I and πs for f ≥ 19 yields the same result. The intermediary only model thus never applies for small n (below n1∗). How-
ever, next we show that it is optimal for somewhat larger n, for a subset of the (f,α) parameter space.
We haveΠIs;m¼1NΠs;m¼1;QB¼0 for f N f ¼ 2−2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1−αð Þ3
p
−α 3−αð Þ
α2 , where f 2b fb f max, andΠs,m = 1
I N πl, for nNn ΠIs;m¼1¼πlð Þ. This is the lower intersection of
the n-range for which the intermediary only solution can be optimal. n ΠIs;m¼1¼πlð Þmust be smaller thann
I
d¼g ¼ gpþ1− ﬃﬃfp (from A.7), forΠs,m = 1I to apply.
Equality gives that f can be no larger than f ¼ 8−16αþ9α2þ4 2−αð Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1−αð Þ 1−2αð Þ
p
8−7αð Þ2 (where f b f max). This threshold is, in turn, only larger than f for α b
α− ¼ 56−
53−6
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
78
pð Þ13þ 53−6 ﬃﬃﬃﬃ78pð Þ−13
12 ≈ 0:42, which is the largest α for which the intermediary only solution ever applies. The upper intersection
depends on the proﬁt curve curvatures. We get two cases. For f ≤ fbef we have that the intermediary only solution is optimal between
n ΠIs;m¼1¼πlð Þ and n ΠIl¼Πs;m¼1;QB¼0ð Þ, where the latter threshold solvesΠ
I
l ¼ Πs;m¼1;QB¼0. For f˜ ≤ f b f , the intermediary only solution holds between
n ΠIs;m¼1¼πlð Þ and n ΠIl¼πlð Þ, which solvesΠl
I= πl. The proﬁt curves never intersect in the large-n region of the bribe and intermediary solution. The
threshold ef solves n ΠIl¼Πs;m¼1;QB¼0ð Þ ¼ n ΠIl¼πlð Þ.
To sum up, Proposition 4A gives the intermediary sector existence conditions ∀f andα∈ α;1ð Þ. Forα∈ 0;αð , there is an f-range, f ≤ fb f , with
f 2b fb fb f max, for which the intermediary only solution is optimal. We get two cases. With f ≤ fbef , for increasing n, we get bribe only, interme-
diary only, bribe and intermediary withQB=0, bribe and intermediary, then bribe only up to nmax. The existence conditions of this case are also
captured by Proposition 4A.Withef ≤ fb f , for increasing n, we get bribe only, intermediary only, bribe only, bribe and intermediary with QB=0,
bribe and intermediary, then bribe only up to nmax. The n-interval for which the intermediary sector exists without direct bribing is thus dis-
continuous, which is Proposition 4B.
The n-thresholds used in the proof are
n πl¼Πlð Þ ¼
4−3αð Þg
pþ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1−α
p
2 1−αð Þ
ﬃﬃﬃ
f
p
þ 2þ 3pð Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1−α
p
−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
−4 2−αð Þ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃf 1−αð Þp þ α2 f þ 4 1−αð Þ 1þ fð Þq 
n
πm¼Πs;m¼1;QB¼0
  ¼ 2 1−αð Þg
1−αð Þ 2 1þ pð Þ−αð Þ−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
−1þ αð Þα α −1þ α þ 4 f−4 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃf1−αp	 
þ 4 −2 f þ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃf1−αp	 
	 
r
n
πl¼Πs;m¼1;QB¼0
  ¼ αg
αpþ 2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α −2þ αð Þ f þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
f 1−αð Þ
p	 
r
n πl¼Πl;m¼1ð Þ ¼
2−αð Þ2g=4
1−α
2
	 

1þ pð Þ−α 1þ p2ð Þð Þ−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
f 1−αð Þ3
q
−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α
4
1−αð Þ 7−αð Þα−8ð Þ f þ 2 2−αð Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
f 1−αð Þ
q s
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g
pþ 2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1−αð Þ
ﬃﬃﬃ
f
p
−2 f
	 

=α
r
n
ΠIl¼Πs;m¼1;QB¼0
  ¼ 2g
1þ 2pþ
ﬃﬃﬃ
f
p
−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1−2
ﬃﬃﬃ
f
p	 

þ 9−5αð Þ f = 1−αð Þ−4
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
f = 1−αð Þ
pr
n ΠIl¼πlð Þ ¼
gð2 1−αð Þ 1þ
ﬃﬃﬃ
f
p	 

þ 4−3αð Þpþ 2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1−αð Þ 1−αð Þ 1þ fð Þ− 2−αð Þ
ﬃﬃﬃ
f
p	 
	 
r
4 1−αð Þ 1þ pð Þ
ﬃﬃﬃ
f
p
þ p 4 1þ pð Þ−α 4þ 3pð Þð Þ :
□
Proof of Proposition 5. As stated in the main text, the intermediary only solution will not be a part of the endogenous n-solution. Maximal proﬁts,
over the rangewhere this solution applies, is at n= nd= gI (fromEq. (A.7)). For this n, over the applicable (f,α) parameter space,Πs,m=1I is always less
than maximum proﬁts in the bribe only model.
Maximizing bribe and intermediary (large-n) proﬁts,Πl and Πl,m = 1, gives
∂Πl
∂n ⇒n
 ¼ gﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
pþ 1ð Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
f 1−αð Þ
p
þ p
	 

−αf
4
r ðA:8Þ
∂Πl;m¼1
∂n ⇒n
 ¼ gﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
pþ 1ð Þ pþ 1−α−2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
f 1−αð Þ
p	 

þ f 1þ αð Þ
r : ðA:9Þ
The former solution is feasible up to the n wherem= 1 starts binding, i.e. at nm = 1 (from Eq. (A.3)). Solving for equality gives that the uncon-
strained optimum in Eq. (A.8) holds for f b f⁎, above which Eq. (A.9) applies. Eq. (A.9) is optimal as long as the proﬁts are higher than
endogenous-n proﬁts in the bribe only model (from Eq. (6)). Equating the proﬁts from Eqs. (6) and (A.9), gives f = f ⁎⁎. We have thus derived the
f-thresholds of Proposition 5.23
It is straightforward to check that n⁎ with either 0 ≤ f b f ⁎ or f ⁎ ≤ f b f ⁎⁎ is strictly greater than when the bribe only solution applies (solve for
equality w.r.t. f and check that the solution falls outside its permitted interval). Next, for the respective parameter spaces where Eqs. (A.8) and (A.9)
apply, compare the aggregate gain of individuals using intermediaries, individuals bribing, and individuals using the regular procedure, to the gain for
the corresponding individuals in the bribe only model. Because d= g, individuals using intermediaries have zero net gain, which is less than in the
bribe only model. As for individuals bribing, one can show that B (from Eq. (A.3)) is always larger than in the bribe only model. Individuals do not
switch to the regular procedure, however. The Ai-threshold
B nð Þ−np
αn
	 

is instead lower, i.e. fewer individuals use the regular procedure. This is because,
for larger n, the regular procedure also implies less gain. All three groups are thus worse off in the bribe and intermediary model.
The derivative∂n

∂ f is always negative for 0≤ f b f ⁎, but can change sign in themiddle interval, depending on (p,α). The aggregate individual gain for
the solutionwith d= g,m N 1, isG ¼ αnf8 þ g−npð Þ
2
2n (using Deﬁnition 1), which gives
∂G nð Þ
∂ f N0over the relevant interval. Finally,
∂m nð Þ
∂ f is always negative
when 0 ≤ f b f ⁎.24
Where:
f  ¼ 4 1−αð Þ 1þ pð Þ 14þ 18p−5α−6
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ pð Þ 5þ 9p−5αð Þp 
4þ 5αð Þ2 ; f
 ¼ 1−αð Þ 1þ pð Þ 2þ 2p−α−2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ pð Þ 1þ p−αð Þp 
α2
:
□23 These f-thresholds both converge to zero asα→ 1 (irrespective of p), as intermediaries then provide the same beneﬁt as bribing and positive entry costs cannot be sustained. Similar to
the bribe only model, and for the f-range where each applies, the optimal procedure lengths in A.8 and A.9 increase in α.
24 The negative derivative,∂n∂ f b0, over 0≤ f b f ⁎can be understood as follows. The bribe level, for the large-n casewith d= g,m N 1, isB ¼ npþ α g−npð Þ−
nα
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
f 1−αð Þ
p
2 , i.e. decreasing in f. As
bureaucrats are bound by Bd ¼ g−n
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
f 1−αð Þ
p
, a larger f has a direct negative effect on indirect bribe proﬁts. This affects the optimal B, which is reduced, to channel individuals to direct
bribing. A larger fraction of proﬁts now stems from direct bribes, giving individuals a time saving of α. This limits the possibility to raise n, as the time saving offered is less valuable to the
aggregate of individuals.
Table A1
The table shows the (n, f, α)-space for which the different solutions of the bureaucracy and intermediary (BI) and intermediary only (I) subgames are optimal, for fN0.⁎ All
thresholds are deﬁned in expressions (4), (A.3) and (A.7), and in the proof above. As stated in Proposition 4B, the only discontinuous n-interval, with respect to intermediary
existence, is for α≤α, ef ≤ fb f .
BI BI I I BI BI BI
d b g d b g d b g d = g d b g d = g d = g
m N 1 m = 1 m = 1 m N 1 m = 1 m = 1 m N 1
QB N 0 QB N 0 QB = 0 QB N 0 QB N 0
α ∈ (0,1)
(0, f1) 0, nd = g nd = g, n πl¼Πlð Þ
[ f1, f2) 0, nd = g′ nd = g′ , nm = 1 nm = 1, n πl¼Πlð Þ
α∈ 0;αð 
[ f2, f3) n, nd = g′′ nd = g′′ , nm = 1 nm = 1, n πl¼Πlð Þ
f 3; f
h 

n, nd = g′′ nd = g′′ , n πl¼Πl;m¼1ð Þ
f ; efh 
 n ΠIs;m¼1¼πlð Þ , nd = gI nd = gI , n ΠIl¼Πs;m¼1;QB¼0ð Þ n ΠIl¼Πs;m¼1;QB¼0ð Þ , nd = g′′ nd = g′′ , n πl¼Πl;m¼1ð Þef ; fh 
 n ΠIs;m¼1¼πlð Þ , nd = gI nd = gI , n ΠIl¼πlð Þ n, nd = g′′ nd = g′′ , n πl¼Πl;m¼1ð Þ
f ; f max
h 

n, nd = g′′ nd = g′′ , n πl¼Πl;m¼1ð Þ
α∈ α;1ð Þ
[ f2, f3) n, nd = g′′ nd = g′′ , nm = 1 nm = 1, n πl¼Πlð Þ
[ f3, fmax) n, nd = g′′ nd = g′′ , n πl¼Πl;m¼1ð Þ
⁎ Being a degenerate interval, f=0 is excluded from the table. For f=0, the n-intervals are the same as for (0, f1), i.e. set f=0 in nd = g (which then equals n1∗∗ from expression (11)) and
n πl¼Πlð Þ . As was discussed in Section 3.2, however, QB = 0 binds.
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The model solved has some general properties that hold for other Ai-distributions. In the subgame solutions (i.e. Eqs. (4), (A.3) and (A.7)), for
small n, when no constraints bind, bribes (and intermediary fees) are linear in n. The intermediary mark-up is linear in n. The linearity implies con-
stant demand and proﬁts linearly increasing in n. The result arises because the gain from bribing/using an intermediary is proportional to n, and costs
np are transferred to individuals; therefore, the optimal bribes/fees are also linear in n. This is always the case, irrespective of the Ai-distribution.
Taking the model in Appendix A.3 as the example, one can use the substitution x ¼ Bd−npn , where, after solving for d(Bd), d−Bdn will also be a function
of x. Solving w.r.t. x, we get Bd = n+ xn. Proﬁts thus increase linearly in n for small n and are instead maximized for large n (where d= g).
We next show, for three distributions h(Ai) (uniform, linear decreasing, linear increasing), that intermediaries decrease Gwhen n is endogenous,
i.e. that more competition (m↑), leads to longer procedures and less gain. In the region where d= g, we get:
h Aið Þ ¼ 1⇒ΠId¼g ¼
g−n−npð Þ n 1þ pþmpð Þ−g 1þmð Þð Þ
mn
⇒ n ¼ g
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þmpﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ pð Þ 1þ pþmpð Þp
h Aið Þ ¼ 2 1−Aið Þ⇒ΠId¼g ¼
g−n−npð Þ n 1þ pþ 2mpð Þ−g 1þ 2mð Þð Þ
2mn
⇒ n ¼ g
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ 2mpﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ pð Þ 1þ pþ 2mpð Þp
h Aið Þ ¼ 2Ai⇒ΠId¼g ¼
g−n−npð Þ n2− 1þ 2mð Þ g−npð Þ2
	 

2mn g−npð Þ ⇒ 1 ¼
n2 −g2 þ 2gn 1þ pð Þ−n2p 1þ pð Þ
	 

g2−n2p 1þ pð Þ  g−npð Þ2 1þ 2mð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
at n¼n
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
In the ﬁrst two cases, it is straightforward to show that ∂n

∂m N0, in the last case an increase inmmust be accompanied by an increase in n for the
ﬁrst-order condition (shown) to hold. Thus, we have that an increase in m results in longer licensing procedures in all three cases. Because d= g,
individuals using intermediaries are indifferent. Individuals using the regular procedure are worse off, i.e. the aggregate is worse off.References
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